Developing Research Question and Hypothesis

Developing a Research Question At the beginning of every research, specific research questions should be clarified before a data collection process. By making a specific scientific inquiry, the research acquires its thematic focus. However, before a research question is refined, it is imperative to define what type of research is engaged, as well as what kind of variables are involved into the scientific exploration.Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Developing Research Question and Hypothesis specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More Hence, there are two types of research – descriptive and exploratory. In order to focus on a descriptive research, several aspects should be discussed (De Vaus, 2002). First, time frames of interest must be defined to narrow the focus of research. Second, geographic location of interest should be highlighted, as well as patterns and features of the chosen groups within this location (De Vaus, 2002). Finally, once location and time are defined, it is necessary to define the topic limits of the research. All these aspects build a starting point of the research and focus on a particular problem in a broader context. When exploratory research is concerned, the emphasis should be placed on the analysis of causes and effects (De Vaus, 2002). The second step will involve enumeration of the sequence of cause-and-effect lines that fit the topic. Third, it is strongly suggested to look through previous researches to find out what other scholars have introduced, as well as what implications they defined for further research (De Vaus, 2002). Using limitations and implications can allow to build a foundation for a new topic of research. Overall, descriptive research is less sophisticated than exploratory and, therefore, it influences the development of research questions. Thus, descriptive research questions focus on describing an event whereas exploratory research questions i nvolve a synthesis of factors that are interrelated and influence each other. Developing a Hypothesis A research question formulation is more typical of qualitative research where observations and surveys will give answers to a specific problem. In contrast, a hypothesis aims either to accept or to reject the thesis. At the early stage of research design, a tentative assumption is defined, which is called the null hypothesis and is traditionally denoted H0 (Anderson et al., 2011). While formulating the above-presented hypotheses, the importance of situational context is incredible because it affects further procedures of sample collection (Anderson et al., 2011). Apart from the actual procedures of hypotheses development, two important questions should be posed. Specifically, the researcher should clearly identify the purpose of the sample collection, as well as predict the desirable conclusion that can be reached while defining the hypothesis.Advertising Looking for essay on e ducation? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More While defining both types of hypotheses, it is not necessarily to follow the established succession. In certain situations, it is more reasonable to develop an alternative hypothesis and formulate the null hypothesis and vice versa. Because null hypothesis challenges the alternative one, which is the opposition to the former, the outcome should withdraw one assumption and accept another (Anderson et al., 2011). Therefore, both hypotheses are mutually exclusive. Narrowing Down the Focus of Research Questions and Hypotheses Refining the scope of a research question is a daunting task. Because data collection should be initiated, the research question should be flexible, but further exploration will require specificity (Kirby et al., 2006). This stage of focusing and narrowing should be connected with the strategies to define the topic that would captivate the audience and advance the research process. In this respect, the research question should relate to the research scope, but it should be too specific that makes it difficult to answer (Kirby et al., 2006). A question should invite the scholar to search information so as it is easy to define which keywords should be used to direct the research. Further, a question should be connected to the existing experiences of a researcher. Finally, the research question should correspond with the results, as well as resonate the community’s concerns (Kirby et al., 2006). The actuality and relevancy of the research question will help the researcher to find out the actual value of the scientific exploration. The research questions can both address qualitative and quantitative concerns. For instance, it is possible to ask what percentage of population has a certain experience in apposition to the one who lack such (Kirby et al., 2006). Alternatively, the research question can fin out the nature of experience and certain patt erns of behavior that are influenced under a new program or innovation. Focusing on the scope of a research hypothesis, specific topic should be highlighted. For instance, in case the topic is consumer behavior, it is purposeful to first define the percentage of women buying a specific product, as well as the number of males involved in buying a specific product (Panneerselvam, 2004). Further, income level should also be introduced to define how it influences the distribution of buying capacity. As soon as all these interaction have been detected, a null hypothesis can be defined. For example, the null hypothesis will be females buy cosmetics more frequent than males where the alternative hypothesis female do not buy cosmetics more frequent than males.Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Developing Research Question and Hypothesis specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More References Anderson, D. R., Sweeney, D. J., and Willi ams, T. A. (2011). Statistics for Business and Economics. US: Cengage Learning. De Vaus, D. A. (2002). Surveys in Social Research. US: Routledge. Kirby, S. L., Greaves, L., and Reid, C. (2006). Experience Research Social Change: Methods beyond the Mainstream. Canada: University of Toronto. Panneerselvam, R. (2004). Research Methodology. US: PHI Learning. This essay on Developing Research Question and Hypothesis was written and submitted by user Lewis Kane to help you with your own studies. You are free to use it for research and reference purposes in order to write your own paper; however, you must cite it accordingly. You can donate your paper here.

Principal-Agent theory1 Essays

Principal-Agent theory1 Essays Principal-Agent theory1 Paper Principal-Agent theory1 Paper At its simplest, principal-agent theory examines situtations in which there are two main actors, a principal who is usually the owner of an asset, and the agent who makes decisions which affect the value of that asset, on behalf of the principal. As applied to the firm, the theory often identifies the owner of the firm as principal, and the manager as agent, but the principal could also be a manager, and an employee nominated by the manager to represent him in some aspect of the business could be the agent. In this case the asset, which the agents decisions could enhance or diminish, is the managers reputation. To explain the relationship between principal-agent (or agency) theory, and other theories of the firm, we turn to Williamsons (1985, pp. 23-29) categorisation of approaches in IO in terms of their views on contracts. There are two main such approaches or branches: monopoly, which views contracts as a means of obtaining or increasing monopoly power, and efficiency, which views contracts as a means of economising. The early work on SCP and particularly on barriers to entry, for example, belong on the monopoly branch of contracts. Both transaction cost and principal-agent theories belong on the efficiency branch (together with most of what Williamson calls the New Institutional Economics). Thus, in Williamsons perspective, agency theory is the theory that focuses on the design and improvement of contracts between principals and agents. Among the major concerns of principal-agent theory is the relationship between ownership and control2, and in this respect it can be seen to have emerged from the managerial theory tradition. Indeed, in that it focuses on the contractual aspects of that relationship, and often adopts game-theoretic methods, principal-agent theory can be seen as a new IO version of a sub-set of managerial theory. Recent work in this area tends to be highly theoretical3. Principal-agent theory sees the firm as does neoclassical theory as a legal entity with a production function, contracting with outsiders (including suppliers and customers) and insiders (including owners and managers). There is information asymmetry between principals and agents, but, unlike in transaction cost theory (which usually assumes bounded rationality) there is often assumed to be unbounded rationality. We will discuss this in more detail below; in the context of the design of contracts between principals and agents, unbounded rationality refers to the ability of those designing the contract to take all possible, relevant, future events into consideration. The principal may know various things not known to the agent (in relation, for example, to the prospects of the firm), and vice versa (the agent may have a lower commitment to the firm than he leads the principal to believe), but if the obligations of both under the contract can be specified, taking into consideration the possibilites arising from private information, then there is unbounded rationality despite the information asymmetry. The agency theorists concerns and in this they are different from neoclassical theorists are with owners and managers problems of coping with asymmetric information, measurement of performance, and incentives (Chandler, 1992b). The major difference between principal-agent and transaction cost theories is that the former focuses on the contract, the latter on the transaction. The problem for principal-agent theory is how to formulate a contract such that the shareholders (the principal) will have their interests advanced by the manager (the agent), despite the fact that the managers interests may diverge from those of the shareholders4. Where objectives of the agent are different from those of the principal, and the principal cannot easily tell to what extent the agent is acting self-interestedly in ways diverging from the principals interests, then the problem of moral hazard arises. The problem originated in the insurance industry, referring to the possiblity that people with insurance will change their behaviour, resulting in larger claims on the insurance company than would have been made if they had continued to behave as they did before they had insurance. This change in behaviour may, moreover, be known to the insurer, but may not be fraudulent or, at least, may not be provably fraudulent. In the context of relations between principals and agents, moral hazard refers to the possibility that, once there is a contract, the agent may behave differently from how he would have behaved had he not had the contract. It must, in addition, be difficult to determine whether his behaviour has conformed to the terms of the contract5. This arises particularly where the agent is a member of a team. Principal-agent theorists have attempted, by specifying conditions such as that the managers salary be equal to the expected value of his marginal product, to design contracts on the basis of which there will be an incentive for the manager to act in the shareholders interests. However, the importance of the team element in managerial jobs discredits the notion of a managers marginal product (Aoki, 1984, Ch. 2 and p. 50). This team element6 is also present at the production level. Doeringer and Piore (1971, p. 277) emphasised the importance of social cohesion and group pressure in the establishment of work customs. The process whereby such routines are created, and their importance in the success or otherwise of firms, are central concerns of the evolutionary theory of the firm (Section 2. 4). Principal-agent theory is more concerned with implications for shirking, that is, a reduction in effort by an agent who is part of a team. There may be a slight decline in total output as a result, but the cause will usually be unidentifiable. The shirking manager knows that his diminished effort is unobservable. Shirking is the moral hazard arising from the employment contract. What the principal can do, in the formulation of contracts, to offset shirking (and other types of management misbehaviour), is a key problem of principal-agent theory. There are a number of ways of controlling moral hazard. Rather than attempting to calculate the value of each managers marginal product, managers could each be paid a salary plus a bonus based on the performance of the company. The problem here is that if the utility of leisure is different for different managers, then again some may work more and others less at maximising the long-run value of the firm. (On the other hand, where there is a great deal of cultural homogeneity, as can be argued to be the case in Japan, this salary plus bonus system seems to be effective. ) Other examples of suggestions by principal-agent theorists for solving employment contract problems include the development of efficient ways of monitoring the performance of individual managers (or management teams), providing incentive contracts which reward agents only on the basis of results, bonding (where the agent makes a promise to pay the principal a sum of money if inappropriate behaviour by the agent is detected) and mandatory retirement payments. This last acts like a bond, in that there is a disincentive for the employee to misbehave because if he does misbehave he may be fired, and lose his retirement payment. It should be emphasised that, to the extent that managers want to keep their jobs, the three markets (for corporate control, managerial labour and the firms products) can control moral hazard. In relation to the market for corporate control, for example, Many observers have interpreted the hostile takeovers [of the 1980s] as a corrective response to managerial moral hazard: The takeovers, it is claimed, were intended to displace entrenched managers who were pursuing their own interests at the expense of the stockholders (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 182). The fact that the acquisition share prices were higher than they had been in the market prior to takeover, may be evidence of management misbehaviour or moral hazard. This would be so if the original market value of the shares had been the equivalent of the companys value (net present value of the future stream of profit that could reasonably be expected) under the original management, and the acquisition price was the companys value under the new management. It may, on the other hand, indicate an overestimation by the acquiring firm or individual of its/his capacity to improve the performance of the company. Milgrom and Roberts (1992, pp. 182-3) seem to conclude that the takeover premium was indicative of moral hazard when arguing that there is other evidence of management misbehaviour in the adoption during the 1980s by management of the poison pill defence against takeovers. The poison pill is a special security, which gives the holder the right to acquire shares at very low prices in the event of a hostile takeover. Poison pills were created by management, in some cases without shareholder approval. If, as Stiglitz (1991) suggests, the acquiring firm in takeovers generally experiences no increase in its own share values, then it is more likely that there has in fact been an overestimation by the acquiring firm of its ability to improve the performance of the target company. This is indicative, in other words, of an overestimation of the moral hazard of the managerial employment contract. The most obvious solution to the problem of conflict of interest between principal and agent is for the principal to become his own agent. Where there is team production, and the existence of a monitor can reduce shirking by enough to pay his own salary, then it may be appropriate for that monitor also to be the owner of the firm. If he is not the owner, then there could be a need to monitor the monitor, to ensure that he does not shirk. This leads to the conclusion that the existence of firms in which there is an owner and a group of people working as a team for that owner, is a consequence of the need to monitor team production, and the need for the monitor himself to be the owner with, for example, the power to fire shirkers, to pay each of the members of the team in accordance with his view of their productivity, to keep the residual and to sell the firm8. We return to the question of the basis for the existence of firms in the next section, where transaction cost theory, among other things, takes exception to principal-agent theorys conclusion about the significance of the need for monitoring. 1 This section draws in part on Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, Ch. 6. The reader is encouraged to read that chapter for more details, particularly on the relationship between moral hazard and performance incentives. For game theoretic perspectives on the relationship between principals and agents, see Gardner, 1995, Ch. 10. 2 See, for example, the article on the separation of ownership and control by Fama and Jensen, 1983. Other important articles on principal-agent theory include Mirrlees, 1976 and Fama, 1980. 3 See, for example, Maskin and Tirole, 1992, who analyse as a three-stage game the relationship between the principal and agent in which the principal has private information that directly affects the agents payoff. 4 or, to express it in terms closer to those of the theorists in this area, the problem is whether there exists any class of reward schedule for the agent (the manager) such as to yield a Pareto-efficient solution for any pair of utility functions both for the agent and the principal (Aoki, 1984, p. 49). 5 An example of moral hazard in employment contracts arises in universities, where there are two different groups of employees, those on short-term contracts, and those with tenure. Tenure is supported by many, and not only those who have tenure(!), as a feature of the independence of the academic, and the need to protect the academic against political pressure. Tenure may perform this function to some extent but it also enables those who have it, to change their behaviour and shirk various duties. The academic on short term contract, it can be argued, works hard, prepares excellent lectures, volunteers for administrative duties, does above average research and publishing. Then he obtains tenure, relaxes more, gives last years lectures, avoids administration, and does less research and publishing. In practice there is, no doubt, moral hazard in tenure, but given that the best teachers, administrators and researchers in academia have tenure, academics certainly do not always, or even usually, change their behaviour in the way predicted by moral hazard. 6 raised, as we saw in Chapter 2, by Alchian and Demsetz, 1972. 7 quoted in Aoki, 1984, p. 26. 8 For a more detailed discussion on the issue of team production and the monitor as owner, see Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989, or at a more introductory level, Douma and Schreuder, 1992, Chapter 6.

Internship experience Term Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Internship experience - Term Paper Example This report develops a sense of women entrepreneurs on the basis of both current and academic literature reviews. In both cases, limited information and the unavailability of statistical data were the core problem to carry out the project. Gathering information from women is as difficult as MENA (Middle East and North Africa) due to cultural constraints. Many of the businesswomen do not operate their business publicly and cannot register their business officially. Design: Due to the lack of statistical data and difficulties in Arabian society qualitative research based methodology is considered here. The research comprised of 30 in-depth interviews with Saudi women entrepreneurs who were identified through referrals from my supervisor Marwah Asilan (Director of Chamber of Commerce and industry). Moreover the hypothesis of this project is also formed on the basis of some books like Global Empowerment of Women by Carolyn (2013) and Saudi Women by Fatany (2007). Purpose: The empowerment of women in different sectors is my area of interest and the subject of research. However due to lack of information in entrepreneurs’ business practice several questions regarding the survival and growth strategies, their perception of entrepreneurial carriers have yet not answered. To address this gap this study is done by me. The main purpose of this study is to examine their motivating factors, perception and business challenges. Findings: There is a Saudi chamber of Commerce and Industry in each major business center in Saudi Arabia. In Madinah this institution specially focuses on the formation of female oriented jobs. It provides helpful networking opportunities for women to the job market. Being a member of this organization I have also tried to find out some possible job opportunities for them. Here I have considered married women with their children and they operated service business. The business included spas and beauty salons, a computer graphic and repair shop, market consultants, public relations. All women had college education. In these findings some strategies are suggested that will motivate the women to be entrepreneur in Saudi Arabia. This research is evaluated on the basis of some questions. These questions were set up on the basis of their financial achievement and satisfaction from their working experience. The study has also emphasized on the problems faced by them being inhabitants of this country. Implication: The main constraint of this study is the limited source of data. A more extensive research is needed and the research area should have a number of dimensions including the selection of industries and countries. My role as an intern was to help the organization lay the foundation for women empowerment. Some advantages of the women entrepreneurship are as follows. Women become interested to pursue higher education. The females of new generation are more concerned about their valued in the society. The government has taken an initiative step to encourage the entrepreneurial women and has opened separate financial institutions for women. Unlike some countries they can easily get informal credit that helps them to explore their business. There are also some disadvantages. The women need male permission whenever they are going to take participation in the job market. Though the government has already taken some steps but it is not